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Abstract:
We study the difficulty that can be caused by firms’ use of specialized language, or code, when
organizations merge, and whether participants’ valuations of mergers take this difficulty into
account.  The experiments use a picture-naming paradigm.  Subjects are grouped into “firms,”
separately at two universities, and create code words to describe a series of pictures from their
own college campus, rapidly and clearly.  The codes are a component of “organizational
culture,” which can be created rapidly and has efficiency properties.  After creating a shared
code, subjects from two firms are placed into a merged group, based on payments they demand
to join that group, and must name a mixture of pictures from both campuses.  The bids both
allow self-selection and enable a test of whether subjects who join the merged group
underestimate the difficulty of code integration.  Performance clearly decreases in the merged
firm because of differences in code and unfamiliarity with pictures of the other campus.  Guesses
by all subjects about post-merger performance, and the values of low bidders revealed by
Vickrey auctions and inferred from first-price auction bids, underestimated the difficulty of
merger on average.  Inferred values overall indicate fairly accurate guesses about the difficulty of
integration, but the lowest values (corresponding to those who actually join the merger) are too
optimistic, reflecting an “organizational winner’s curse.”  In a second merger phase, however,
guesses and bids are more accurate (but slightly pessimistic), which indicates a capacity to learn
to use code in merged groups from one merger event to another, and to forecast more accurately
from one merger to the next.
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21.  Introduction
Corporate culture is the value system, symbols, ideas, icons, stories, and language that
express the informal contracts between a firm and its employees, customers, and
suppliers—“how business is done” at a company.  Conflicts in corporate culture appear to
contribute to merger failures, but there is little systematic research on this topic.  The scarcity of
attention paid to conflicts that affect billion-dollar transactions may be partly due to the difficulty
of operationalizing the vague concept of corporate culture precisely.
In this paper, we focus on one very simple component of culture that can be created
experimentally and measured clearly—the code, or specialized language used within a firm.
Code is one facet of culture and also has some of the properties of other facets (e.g., values and
symbols): Code can be productive by coordinating activity, is usually durable, and is often path-
dependent and difficult to recreate or copy.  To study code creation, we create simple “firms” in
a laboratory setting, and use a picture-naming paradigm (Weber and Camerer, 2003) in which
they develop code.  We then examine the impact on performance when two firms with
specialized codes for different pictures are merged together.  We are also interested in other
features of a merger, such as perceptions of how difficult mergers are, and the endogenous
choice of whether to join the merger, and we measure these phenomena by having subjects bid
for extra payments to join the merger.
These experimental organizations are highly stylized and simple.  But their simplicity
gives us precision in measuring variables and understanding the determinants of performance.  In
the experimental world, the code words subjects use are their culture; the money they earn is
their organizational performance.  Furthermore, the experiments are simply a platform onto
which complications can be built, as theory suggests what complications are most interesting.
3We learn the most in any empirical science from a series of experiments, which cumulate into
regularity.  The earliest experiments in any series will necessarily be the simplest (just as theory
develops from simple to more complex).  Therefore, criticism of the simplicity of the design is
most useful when it comes in the form of a suggestion for an enriched design (provided it is
feasible) and a conjecture about how the enrichment will change behavior.
a.  Merger Failure
Although mergers are often met with excitement on Wall Street and in the boardroom,
there is ample evidence that acquiring firm shareholders often lose from mergers (e.g. Andrade,
Mitchell, and Stafford, 2001).  Most of these studies use stock market returns in a short window
of time around the merger announcement, so they rely on the hypothesis that the stock market
guesses future merger success accurately.  By using only returns it is impossible to tell whether
mergers actually generate anticipated economic synergies years later, and whether acquiring
firms overpay even if synergies do result.
In careful studies using FTC Line-of-Business data to compare acquired firms to similar
firms that did not merge, Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987, 1989) find that on average, acquired
firms are less profitable than before the acquisition, and mergers often result in later divestitures.
The high turnover rates that accompany mergers are frequently attributed to firing poor managers
in the acquired firm, but the best managers are actually the ones who are most likely to leave in
the first year after a merger (Walsh and Ellwood, 1991; Walsh, 1988).
Some of the problems that occur when firms merge can be attributed to clashes in the
culture of the firm.  A 1992 Coopers and Lybrand study on the largest acquisitions in the United
Kingdom from the late 1980s to the early 1990s found that the executives surveyed considered
454 percent of the acquisitions to be failures.  Target management attitudes and cultural difference
was the most widely-cited cause of merger failure; 85 percent of those surveyed listed it as a key
factor. (Sudarsanam, 1995)
Firms often seem to underforecast how differing ways of doing business can prevent the
imagined synergies of a merger.  Sony, known for its innovative consumer electronics, branched
into the entertainment industry in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, acquiring firms like CBS
Records and Columbia Pictures.  Now, conflicts of interest between the electronics and
entertainment divisions stymie the development of popular products, such as portable music
players that allow audio files to be easily transferred from computers.  Sony’s electronics
division is home to such revolutionary products as the Walkman and the most successful
transistor radio, and its developers would be expected to lead the way in creating groundbreaking
digital media devices.  But the entertainment division is part of an industry with a long history of
battling anything that could potentially foster piracy, such as CDs and VCRs.  The entertainment
side of Sony insists on copy protection mechanisms that make the products developed by the
electronics division too cumbersome to be widely sold.  Sony has even produced a music CD
that could not be read on its own computers.  The opposing value systems at the two warring
sides of Sony prevent each division from profiting as much as they likely would on their own.
(Rose, 2003)  Given the difficulty of realizing the synergies between entertainment and
electronics, it makes little economic sense to have those two divisions combined under one
corporate roof.
The AOL-Time Warner merger is a “perfect storm” in which many factors, including
culture, combined to create an unsuccessful merger (see Klein, 2003). Time Warner employees
valued a “best in class” structure, in which each division strove to be the best compared to other
5companies in its field.  Under this structure, each division essentially operated as its own
separate firm.  There was little communication between different divisions, and few successful
joint projects.  Being unused to this independence, AOL employees were appalled at being
charged for services by a division of AOL-Time Warner.  In turn, genteel Time Warner workers
were disgusted at the crass language AOL employees would use in the boardroom and even with
clients.  AOL employees had developed a reputation for shouting at and exploiting clients
(defrauding advertisers on AOL), in sharp contrast to Time Warner’s polite business etiquette
and old-school decorum.  Although the cultures of AOL and Time Warner were bound to clash,
the CEO’s who engineered the merger and the boards who approved it did not seem to
acknowledge this possible clash or its effects.  In April 2002, accounting rules requiring firms to
recognize declines in stock values after mergers led to a $54 billion write-off, the largest
corporate loss in U.S. history.  In December 2004 Time Warner (which shed the “AOL” part of
its name in 2003) paid $510 million to settle accounting fraud allegations at AOL.
b. Code
Given the tremendous impact culture can have on firms’ ability to successfully integrate,
we would like to gain a better understanding of cultural conflict in a merged firm, and learn
whether participants anticipate that conflict.  But a full-blown culture cannot be created
overnight, much less in a short experimental session.  One aspect of culture, however, can be
quickly developed—the language used to communicate within a firm.  We call the language
component of culture “organizational code.”  Codes are sets of words or phrases that are used to
efficiently convey information within an organization.  Code allows members of an organization
to describe aspects of their complex environment and reduce the costs of communication.
6(Arrow, 1974; Crémer, Garicano, and Prat, 2004; Wernerfelt, 2004)  It typically develops as
members of an organization interact over time, and it is therefore unlikely to be easily
understood by outsiders.
The use of codes and jargon in organizations is commonplace.  To a cop, “11-27” means
“subject has a felony record but is not wanted”; in a fast-moving kitchen, “give it some radar
love” is an instruction to microwave a dish; air traffic controllers call the holding area for planes
whose arrival gates are occupied the “penalty box” (which is an actual box in hockey).  In all
these situations, the members of the organization know the code and use it to quickly
communicate with each other.  Besides coordinating activity rapidly and clearly, code serves
other organizational purposes.  Code can: inspire (“just do it!”); identify who is in a group and
who isn’t; relieve tension (“circling the drain” is emergency room slang for a patient who has
suddenly taken a turn for the worse, “code brown” for a bed with excrement); identify villains
(“Larry Parker syndrome”, a patient complaining of pain who is looking for an insurance
settlement); and sanitize tragedy (“collateral damage”, military slang for civilian casualties).
 Although efficient code normally takes a while to develop, it can be created quickly.
People working on a project together may choose to create a common set of definitions that they
will use throughout the task.  (Crémer, Garicano, and Prat, 2004)  Even robots have been found
to quickly develop code, in an artificial intelligence experiment in which robots equipped with
video cameras took turns describing what they “saw” to the other robot, which had to guess the
object being described.  Words that had been used successfully with the most frequency became
the ones that would always be used to describe a certain object. (Steels, 2003)
Organizational culture is obviously more than code, but code is a good place to start
because it can be created so rapidly, and has many similarities to the larger concept of culture.
7Although definitions of organizational culture vary, it is generally described as a shared social
understanding among members of an organization, resulting in commonly held assumptions and
views of the world. (Weber, Rick, and Camerer, 2004; Schein, 1985, 1990, Crémer, 1993)  In
economic terms, culture allows members of an organization to tacitly coordinate actions and
provides guidelines for behavior under unforeseen change. (Kreps, 1990)  Language plays an
important role in culture because it restricts what can be communicated and shapes the way
people think.  Language also reflects the shared values and beliefs of a society or organization.
(Weber, Rick, and Camerer, 2004)
In recent theory, organizational code is created out of the need for rapid, clear
communication between group members.  More precise or longer messages provide more
information, but they cost more to communicate than shorter messages do.  (Crémer, Garicano,
and Prat, 2004; Wernerfelt, 2004)  In our study, laboratory firms will have to develop code to do
well in a task that rewards speed and accuracy.
2.  The Picture-Naming Paradigm
We use the picture-naming paradigm introduced in experimental economics by Weber
and Camerer (2003) to examine the problems that can arise in a merger based on lack of a
common code.1  In our experiment, groups of people behave as a firm, with one manager and
several employees working to accomplish a task.  In every round of this task, each person in a
group sees a set of eight pictures.  Everyone in a group sees the same pictures, but they are
                                                 
1 Our experiment has several innovations beyond Weber and Camerer’s.  They used a single set
of pictures so differences in group code were modest.  By using two groups of students from
different campuses, we generated a more natural and large variation in code and expertise.  They
forced mergers.  We allowed self-selection into the merged firms, which enables us to detect an
optimistic bias in bids, and a winner’s curse among low bidders.  Our computerized interface
also allows more precise measurement of time and code.
8displayed in different configurations on each person’s screen.  The manager is privately informed
about a subset of target pictures and must describe these pictures to the employees who don’t
know which pictures are targets.  Employees must correctly identify each picture.  Incorrect
guesses are penalized and earnings are reduced by a multiple of the amount of time taken to
name all four pictures.  In order to earn money, the laboratory “firms” must develop a shared
language to quickly and accurately identify each picture—they create code.
Figure 1.  Picture from Caltech campus.
The design is meant to have central features of a typical horizontal or diversifying
merger, in which two firms who make related products, but have differences in culture and code,
merge and must coordinate activity.  To create differences, and challenging mergers, we make
use of the fact that a typical student is an expert on his school environment.  To create natural
9cultural differences (and potentially, conflict) we use students at both UCLA and Caltech
participating simultaneously through the web.  The picture sets contain images of buildings,
fountains, and other features of both the UCLA and Caltech campuses.  Some of the code groups
use has already been created, since there are proper names or slang for most of the buildings and
landmarks seen in the pictures.  But separate groups at Caltech and at UCLA do not all use the
same code for each picture.  For example, the image from the Caltech campus pictured in Figure
1 was coded as “Millikan bridge,” “Millikan pond,” “arch bridge,” and “bridge over pond” by
various groups at Caltech.
Figure 2.  Picture from UCLA campus.
Within each group, the code used for a picture would evolve over many rounds.  For one
group at UCLA, the first description of the image in Figure 2 was “rectangle; its a flat building;
with one tree; looks like haines; grass in front; its not that hard.” [sic, semi-colons indicate
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separate lines of type]  The second description of this image (from a different manager in the
group) was shorter: “rectangular with grass in front; looks like castle; 2 trees.”  The third
description was “rectangle closer up [to contrast to another building described as a rectangle];
with trees.”  Eventually, the group quickly identified this image as “rect, castle” or simply
“castle.”  Although code varied both among and within groups, it often reflected expertise
present at each school that students at the other campus would not have (e.g., a UCLA student
would not describe the Figure 1 picture with the name “Millikan,” and may not even recognize a
bridge over a pond).
In each experimental session, six students at UCLA start out in one group and six
students at Caltech are in another group.  Each group participated in a 40-round training phase, in
which the group would have to name pictures from its own campus, to cement a campus-specific
code.  Then two people from each school were placed in a “mixed” group, while the remaining
four participants at each school stayed in an “unmixed” group.  Members of the mixed group saw
pictures from both schools, so about half of the pictures each member saw (and the code others
used) would be new to her.  The formation of this mixed group is like a horizontal merger.
Employees from two distinct firms are forced to work together on a common task.  Each person
can contribute some expertise, but everyone must learn how to communicate with each other,
since the code they were previously able to use freely in their own organization may not be
understood by others.
Picture-naming of this sort is like a business where one worker has private information
about which of many scenarios is occurring and must convey it to another worker who can “see”
possible scenarios in the mind’s eye. The analogy between the lab and the field holds if one
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accepts the hypothesis that experimental subjects seeing pictures on a screen is like highly-expert
employees who have memories of possible scenarios in their minds.
An example is emergency services like police dispatching, where the dispatcher has
talked to witnesses to a crime and must translate their natural language into code that tells
rapidly-reacting cops what kind of crime scene to expect.  Another example is location scouting
for a film: The location scout sees a physical location and must convey it to a director who
cannot see the scene.  Still another is a busy restaurant kitchen. Imagine an American tourist in
Japan who strays into a local restaurant, and orders by pointing to pictures on a menu or plastic
replicas in a counter case.  A waiter then conveys the order to a cook, but the cook cannot see
what the tourist pointed to.  The cook can visually imagine all the possible dishes; the waiter’s
job is to use language so that the cook imagines the dish that corresponds to what the tourist
pointed to.  This task is very much like the picture-naming task, except that the Japanese cook
“sees” the pictures in his mind rather than on a computer screen.  In a restaurant that is extremely
busy, code that is fast and clear is an asset in production.
We use various measures of performance in the picture-naming task as a way to compare
mixed, or merged groups, containing two members from each school, to the unmixed groups that
contain members from a single school.  We reward quick picture identification and penalize
mistakes, so earnings serve as a composite measure of productivity.  Since the messages are
recorded, we can also count the number of characters used to describe each picture.  Groups can
earn more if their code is short, but there may be limits to how short code can become without
hurting employees’ ability to accurately identify an image.
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a. Hypotheses
While subjects in the unmixed groups see pictures they are already familiar with, the
merged groups face a more difficult task.  About half the pictures a member of the merged group
sees will be from the other school, and members of this group are expected to have trouble
communicating with each other.  We anticipate that merged groups will not perform as well as
the other groups, unless the members are able to gain enough experience to develop efficient
code.  However, since merged groups only participate in a small number of rounds in the picture-
naming task, they are unlikely to gain sufficient experience.  Even though members of merged
groups will be paid an additional sum of money, we do not think it will compensate for the
greater difficulty the merged groups face.  This leads to an obvious first hypothesis:
H1:  Subjects in the mixed group will earn less than subjects in the unmixed
group, even when their additional payments are counted as part of their earnings.
If performance is worse in the mixed group, it is interesting to know whether subjects can
correctly anticipate the difficulty the merged group will have.  Expectations of post-merger
performance are measured in two ways.  First, we ask subjects to record their guesses about the
average amount a member of a merged group will earn during the picture-naming task.  We can
later compare this number to the actual average earnings of the merged group members.  Second,
subjects place bids which are the additional amount of money they would need to be paid to join
the mixed (merged) group.  The subjects who ask for the lowest additional payments are placed
in the merged group.
If subjects fail to account for the difficulty of the picture naming in the mixed group,
guesses of average earnings will be higher than the actual earnings, and bids will be too low.
These overvaluations would be akin to a situation in which two firms guess that a merger will be
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easy and it is actually harder than they expect.  In our design, participants may underestimate the
difficulty of the merger because of a judgment bias, the “curse of knowledge,” in which people
act as if their expertise and knowledge is more widely-shared than it is (Camerer, Loewenstein,
and Weber, 1989).  People have also shown a tendency to assume that their strong emotions and
deceptions are more transparent to others than they really are (Gilovich, Medvec, and Savitsky,
1998).  An illustration of this judgmental bias comes from a simple experiment (cited in Griffin
and Ross, 1991), in which participants would tap out a well-known song on a table and estimate
the proportion of listeners that would correctly identify the tune.  Subjects had trouble realizing
how difficult it would be for the listeners to interpret a succession of knocks on a table as the rich
melody the subjects could “hear” inside their heads, causing them to overestimate the number of
correct guesses.
In our study, participants in the merged group who see a picture from their own campus
will generally be inclined to describe it with its proper name or with the short code that had
previously been used for that picture.  People from the other school should not be expected to
know the proper names, but participants may believe that short descriptions will be quickly
understood.  For example, when a manager from UCLA is looking at a picture of Kerckhoff
Hall, which he tries to describe as “brick building,” he may fail to realize that the other
participants are looking at a series of pictures that contain 3 different brick buildings.  The curse
of knowledge, combined with the scramble to create new code, can cause difficulties for group
members at the manager’s school as well as at the other school.
These ideas lead to a second hypothesis:
H2:  Subjects will overvalue the merger, guessing average earnings for the mixed
group that are higher than the actual earnings of that group.
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The alternative hypothesis to H2 is rationality of expectations: guesses and bids correctly
anticipate, in the sense of a zero mean forecast error, the earnings differential between groups.
4.  Design Details
Nine sessions were run between April and May of 2004.  Another four sessions, which
differed from the original nine in the bidding phase, were run between October and December of
2004.2  Each session was conducted simultaneously at UCLA and Caltech.  All instructions were
the same for both schools.  Subjects were UCLA and Caltech undergraduate and graduate
students.3
The experiment contains three phases, though each phase is composed of a few distinct
tasks (Figure 3).  One of these tasks is the picture-naming task, in which subjects describe and
identify pictures that they see on their computer screens.4  The basic structure of this task is the
same in each phase.  In every round, each person in a group sees eight pictures on her computer
screen, which are chosen randomly from a larger set of 16 pictures.  Pictures are displayed in a
random order on each person’s screen.  One person is designated as the “manager.”  On the
manager’s screen, four of the pictures are numbered 1 to 4.  The manager must describe these
four pictures to the “employees” by typing messages that are sent to all members of the group.
The employees click on a picture to identify it.  Once each employee has correctly identified the
four pictures, or if time runs out (after 300 seconds), the next round begins.  The manager rotates
                                                 
2 A fifth session is excluded from the analysis because one subject with a visual disability
insisted on participating but was very poor at the picture-naming task, which caused the entire
group to perform very poorly.
3 One person at UCLA participated twice (a filtering error) but all others participated only once.
The results do not change substantially if we exclude this person’s groups from the analysis.
4 The experiments used CultureX software, developed by Charlie Hornberger and John Lin.
Documentation on this software is available at http://ruffian.caltech.edu/cx-docs/ .
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cyclically in each round, so participant 1 is the manager in the first round, 2 is the manager in the
second round, and so on.5
Payments for this task are a function of time and accuracy.  Employees earn $0.60 each
round, minus $0.005 for every second it takes to complete the task, and minus $0.50 for each
incorrect guess.  Managers earn the average of the employees’ payoffs.  This payment structure
rewards good code.  The better participants are at creating short but clear descriptions of each
picture, the better they will perform.  
Figure 3.  Timeline of tasks in experiment.
Figure 3 is a diagram of the events that occur in each phase of the experiment.  The first
familiarizes subjects with the picture naming task and allows them to create code in their “area
(campus) of expertise.”  Before this phase begins, participants receive a brief set of instructions,
                                                 
5 Our primary reason for choosing to rotate the manager is based on the finding of Weber, Rick,
and Camerer (2004) that groups with rotating managers incorporate new employees better than
do groups with a fixed manager. Using a rotating manager biases the results against the
hypothesis that subjects will underestimate the difficulty of the merger. Rotation also prevents
outliers that can occur with a single fixed manager who is unusually good or bad.
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and then they participate in a short four-period practice session with different pictures.  Subjects
also complete a short quiz to ensure that they understand the task.
As mentioned earlier, in the first phase there are two separate groups—six UCLA
students in one group, and six Caltech students in the other group.  Each group sees subsets of 16
pictures from their own campus.  There are 40 rounds of the picture-naming task in this stage.
Following this stage, subjects take part in a public good game.6
The second phase is the first merger phase.  At the beginning of this phase, subjects are
told that they will participate in the picture naming task for 10 more periods, but instead of being
in two groups of six, they will be divided into three groups of four.  We explain that of the six
people at each school, two will be chosen to be in a “mixed” group.  The mixed group will see
eight pictures at a time, randomly drawn from a set containing pictures from both original
groups, so on average half the pictures each person sees will be new to her.  However, in
addition to the normal earnings, she will be paid an additional amount to join the mixed group.
The four people at each school who are not in the mixed group will do exactly the same task as
they did in the first phase, except in a four-person group rather than a six-person group.7
                                                 
6 The game was a binary public good game in which subjects could keep $1 or contribute $2 to
the group, which was shared equally, in the first-price sessions only. The game was designed to
test whether suffering through a merger would reduce group camaraderie in a way that is
behaviorally expressed by lower cooperativeness. Across sessions, 73% contributed after the first
40 rounds. After the first two merger phases, the contribution rates were 56% and 39% for
unmixed groups, and 50% and 56% for mixed groups. Comparing average contributions using
group-level analyses yields no significant differences (t25 = 0.473, p = 0.320 for the first phase
and t25 = -1.543, p = 0.068 for the second phase). Because there are no interesting effects, we say
nothing about this game in the text below. It is possible that there is simply no effect of code
creation on “camaraderie”, or that the earnings shortfall of mixed group members actually
created more camaraderie (perhaps from suffering through a difficult bonding experience) rather
than less, or that the two effects are simply too weak to find in this experiment.
7 We call this group “same” in the experimental instructions.
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After explaining the basic structure of the merger, subjects are asked to guess how much
the average person in the mixed group will earn over the next 10 periods (excluding the
additional payments from bids).  They are reminded of the average earnings in each group in the
original picture-naming task, over all 40 periods and also over the last 10 periods, to help
subjects use these data in making their estimates.  They also see sample pictures from the two-
campus pool the mixed group will see.  Subjects who are not in the mixed group are paid $2.00 if
they guess an amount within $0.50 of the actual average earnings of the mixed group.8
When subjects have written down their guesses, they are given instructions on the merger
bidding process.  Subjects are asked to write down the additional amount they would need to be
paid to join the mixed group.  They write this as a total for the ten periods.  The two people from
each original group who bid the lowest amounts are the ones who are placed in the mixed group.9
Then the mixed group and two unmixed groups participate in 10 rounds of the picture-naming
task.  Members of the unmixed group at each school again see pictures from their own campus,
while members of the mixed group see pictures from a set containing eight UCLA campus
pictures and eight Caltech campus pictures.  The eight pictures from each campus were selected
randomly from each original set of 16.  Members of the mixed group earn money from their
performance in the picture-naming task plus the amount they bid to join the group.
The second merger stage (or third phase of the experiment) is run exactly like the
preceding phase, with two exceptions.  The first is that before making their guesses, subjects are
                                                 
8 If subjects in the mixed group were also paid for accurate guesses, they would have an
incentive to guess very low amounts and then perform poorly; this method of payment is
incentive-compatible.
9 To be sure they understood the auction procedure, participants first write down a practice bid.
The experimenter collects these bids, then announces which two people would be in the mixed
group if the bids were counted, though she does not announce their bids.  The bidding forms are
then handed back, so subjects can revise their initial bid if they wish.
18
told the average earnings of the mixed group in the prior ten-period picture-naming task.  The
other difference is that people may leave or enter the mixed group in this stage, based on their
bids.  At the end of the second merger stage, each subject is paid according to his or her total
earnings from all parts of the experiment.
The last four sessions used a different auction mechanism than the first nine sessions.10
The primary difference lay in the style of auction conducted to place members in the mixed
group.  While the first-price auction we used in the first nine sessions is easy to explain to
subjects, in theory, subjects will bid more than their valuations.  To try to make subjects ask for
their lowest acceptable payment, we conducted the last four sessions with a Vickrey, or second-
price, auction.  As before, the two subjects from each school who bid the lowest amounts joined
the mixed group, but in these sessions, they were all paid the third-lowest bid.  The experimental
instructions explained why the auction is incentive-compatible: Subjects should bid exactly the
minimum amount they would accept, because their bid does not determine the amount they
actually get paid.
5.  Results
a.  Auction Treatments
We first compare data from the first-price and Vickrey sessions. Bids do differ between
the two treatments, as predicted by theory.  In the first merger stage, Vickrey bids are
significantly lower than first-price bids (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p = 0.007).11  In the second
merger stage, there is no significant difference between bids across the two treatments (K-S test,
                                                 
10 The other difference in the last four sessions was that the public good game was not conducted
at all.
11 Since some bids are very large, a non-parametric test is used to compare bidding behavior,
rather than determining an arbitrary cut-off point to exclude outliers.  The K-S test will also be
used for other bid comparisons in the paper.
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p = 0.877).  As we will see later, bids in the first-price sessions remained stable across the two
merger stages, but those in the Vickrey treatment rose significantly between the two stages.
Keep in mind that in first-price low-bid auctions of this type, with six bidders competing for two
“objects,” equilibrium bidding requires subjects to bid more than their reservation price (trading
off the risk of losing the auction for additional surplus), just as in high-bid auctions, bidders
should underbid.  Most experiments do show strategic bidding of this sort (e.g., Kagel, 1995).
Extrapolating from these earlier experiments (and theory), it is likely that first-price bids are
inflated relative to true reservation prices.12  The gap between the median Vickrey-auction bid
($.30 in merger phase I) and the median first-price auction bid ($.50 in merger phase I) is
consistent with strategic inflation of bids in the first-price auctions.
The Vickrey treatment was added because, in theory, subjects should just bid their guess
about the earnings differential-- i.e., bidding one’s valuation is a dominant strategy, so there is no
strategic incentive to inflate bids.13  The fact that bids are lower in the Vickrey auctions than in
the first-price auctions suggests that switching auction mechanisms reduces the extent of
strategic inflation, which makes the Vickrey data, in theory, a better test of whether participants
are underestimating the difficulty of the mergers.  We also used an alternative econometric
                                                 
12 Bids and guesses are uncorrelated in the first merger phase for both treatments (Spearman r=-
0.10, p=0.29 and r=-0.01, p=0.96 for first-price and Vickrey, respectively). This suggests that
differences in bid strategy across subjects are present and account for some of the variation
between bids and guesses. In the second merger phase, the guesses (about mixed-group total
earnings) and bids (amounts demanded to join the mixed group, which presumably reflect
expected earnings differences) have reasonable negative correlations, as expected (r= -0.50,
p<0.001, r= -0.44, p=0.002).
13 In experiments, subjects sometimes inflate bids strategically even in Vickrey auctions, where
there is no incentive to do so. Kagel (1995) reviews studies in which subjects do not bid their
values in second-price auctions. Grether et al (2004) provide neural evidence on the difficulty
people have in finding the dominant strategy in these auctions.
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procedure to infer unobserved valuations from actual first-price bids (assuming that subjects are
making equilibrium bids; Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong, 2000).
b.  Overall Performance
Tables 1a and 1b give average (per-period) statistics for performance, guesses, and bids.
Figure 4 shows average earnings across sessions, before additional payments for the mixed group
are included.  The earnings for Caltech and UCLA students are pooled.14
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Round
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 E
a
rn
in
g
s 
(D
o
ll
a
rs
)
Unmixed
Mixed
Second Merger
Stage (51-60)
First Merger
Stage (41-50)
Figure 4.  Average earnings across rounds, all phases.
During the initial 40 rounds, earnings grew as subjects became faster at identifying
pictures and made fewer mistakes.  (See Appendix 1 for average completion times and mistakes
by round.)  From round to round, there is a great deal of variability in subjects’ earnings.  Often a
                                                 
14 Although Caltech students earned significantly more than UCLA students, no interaction was
found between being a Caltech student and being in the mixed group.  Since the differences
between mixed and unmixed groups do not vary by school, we pool data here for ease of
exposition.
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Group Average
Earnings
(Dollars)
Average
Number
of
Mistakes
Average
Completion
Time
(Seconds)
Median
Guesses
($)
Median
Bids*
($)
Median
inferred
value ($)
**
Rounds
1-40
All
(n=108)
0.246
(0.475)
0.29
(0.79)
42.1
(32.6)
Merger
phase 1
Unmixed
(n=72)
0.421
(0.206)
0.13
(0.38)
22.7
(11.1)
0.313
(0.249)
0.600
(0.482)
0.490
(0.495)
Mixed
(n=36)
0.106
(0.468)
0.40
(0.86)
58.0
(30.5)
0.288
(0.171)
0.300
(0.169)
0.025
(0.191)
All: 0.300
(0.225)
All: 0.500
(0.461)
All: 0.381
(0.397)
Merger
phase 2
Unmixed
(n=72)
0.470
(0.130)
0.06
(0.24)
19.7
(7.6)
0.138
(0.139)
0.525
(0.347)
0.445
(0.401)
Mixed
(n=36)
0.246
(0.339)
0.24
(0.66)
48.6
(24.8)
0.150
(0.158)
0.315
(0.183)
0.045
(0.205)
All: 0.150
(0.145)
All: 0.500
(0.342)
All: 0.415
(0.310)
Table 1a.  Summary statistics for first-price sessions, per period.
Group Average
Earnings
(Dollars)
Average
Number of
Mistakes
Average
Completion
Time
(Seconds)
Median
Guesses
(Dollars)
Median
Bids*
(Dollars)
Rounds
1-40
All
(n=48)
0.210
(0.161)
0.29
(0.22)
43.3
(12.3)
Merger
phase 1
Unmixed
(n=32)
0.432
(0.049)
0.07
(0.09)
23.5
(4.0)
0.258
(0.243)
0.480
(1.016)
Mixed
(n=16)
-0.052
(0.294)
0.56
(0.45)
54.9
(11.3)
0.355
(0.166)
0.138
(0.122)
Third-
lowest
(n=8)
0.313
(0.162)
All: 0.291
(0.219)
All: 0.350
(0.902)
Merger
phase 2
Unmixed
(n=32)
0.463
(0.036)
0.04
(0.06)
21.2
(3.6)
0.150
(0.203)
0.575
(0.576)
Mixed
(n=16)
0.120
(0.206)
0.37
(0.27)
46.4
(7.7)
0.108
(0.177)
0.300
(0.224)
Third-
lowest
(n=8)
0.448
(0.228)
All: 0.135
(0.194)
All: 0.500
(0.524)
Table 1b.  Summary statistics for Vickrey sessions, per period.
*Outlying bids above the 97th percentile are set to the highest bid below the 97th percentile for the purpose of
computing standard deviations.  **Only values between 0 and 20 are used for computing standard deviations.
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large dip in earnings was caused by a manager who did not use the established code for a picture
or who confused employees by describing several pictures at once.  The random draws of
pictures each period could also make the task more or less difficult in a given round, since some
images are fairly similar and others are distinct.15  Despite variance in Figure 4, a trend is readily
apparent.  Earnings increased over time for the unmixed groups, eventually asymptoting at
around $0.45 per round.  The mixed groups also increased performance over time, nearly
reaching the earnings of the unmixed groups by the end of the two merger phases of 20 total
rounds.
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Figure 5.  Average code length (characters per picture) by round.16
                                                 
15 Software problems could also cause low earnings.  For each of the eight rounds in which we
were aware that a software glitch occurred, we interpolated data on earnings, completion time,
and incorrect guesses from the two surrounding rounds.
16 One outlier was excluded from the analysis.  In the first round of the second merger stage, one
manager of a mixed group typed advice to the employees before starting to describe the pictures,
causing that group to have a large number of characters per picture.  With the outlier included,
the average for the mixed group in round 51 is 49.9; without the outlier, it is 34.1.
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Figure 5 depicts average code length (the number of characters used by the manager to
describe a single picture) across rounds.  There are a few interesting features of Figure 5.  The
first to note is the relationship between increasing earnings and decreasing code length (that is,
Figure 5 looks like an inverse of Figure 4).  Groups completed each round quickly once they had
established clear, short codes for each picture.  Another feature is the similarity of the decrease in
code length for the first mixed group in rounds 41-50 and the original groups in early rounds 1-
10.  The mixed group initially used slightly longer descriptions than the original groups at each
school had, but both the mixed and the original groups reduced their code to about 20 characters
per description by the end of 10 rounds.  One would expect the mixed group to take a longer time
to shorten the code than the original groups, since the original groups could easily use names of
buildings and other campus features in their descriptions.  This result may reflect subjects’
improved ability to create new code after 40 training periods, or the fact that subjects in many
mixed groups tried to teach each other the code they had previously used for each picture in the
training stage.
c.  First Merger Stage
The mixed groups clearly have more trouble with the picture-naming task than the
unmixed groups.  They use longer code, take more time, and make more costly mistakes.  The
next question is whether subjects accurately anticipate the worse performance of the mixed
groups.  The evidence indicates subjects are generally too optimistic, but the results are
somewhat sensitive to the type of bids.
There are three ways to measure whether subjects correctly forecasted the lower earnings
in the mixed group— guesses, bids, and (for the first-price auctions) inferred values.  Table 2
summarizes the differences between these statistics and the actual mixed-group earnings.
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Guesses in the first merger phase were generally too optimistic.  Eighty-four percent of the
forecast errors (actual earnings minus guesses) were negative, and 69 percent of the guesses were
more than $1 above the mixed group’s actual earnings.
Table 2. Summary of per-period average forecast errors and earnings differentials. Errors should
be negative if subjects are too optimistic, and positive if they are too pessimistic.
*Negative values are set to 0.
Because forecast errors are correlated (due to shared dependence on the mixed-group
average earnings), we use a random resampling bootstrapping method to estimate a confidence
interval around the mean forecast error.  Pooling both auction conditions, the mean error is -
$2.42 (for all 10 periods), with a 95% confidence interval of [-2.85, -1.99], so the difference
between the forecast errors and zero is highly significant.
Analysis of bids is a bit less conclusive, but it is suggestive that bidders who join the
mixed group underestimate the earnings differential.  One test focuses on mixed-group earnings
with bids added in, minus unmixed-group earnings.  If this difference is negative then subjects
Mean forecast
error (std.
error)
Mean net
earnings
differential (std.
error)
Mean inferred net
earnings
differential (std.
error)
Merger
phase
Auction
type
Mixed earnings-
guesses
(Bid + mixed
earnings) –
unmixed earnings
(Inferred value* +
mixed earnings) –
unmixed earnings
1 1st price -0.194 (0.024) 0.024 (0.024) -0.147 (0.263)
1 Vickrey -0.343 (0.053) -0.315 (0.054)
2 1st price 0.096 (0.013) 0.117 (0.021) -0.036 (0.234)
2 Vickrey -0.015 (0.019) 0.036 (0.012)
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who make low bids and join the mixed group earn less than their counterparts in the unmixed
group.
First note that there are three possible levels of analysis—taking each session as a data
point, taking each group as a data point, and taking each subject as a data point. Since each
subject shares a common group experience, their earnings differentials are correlated so
traditional tests assuming independence will overstate significance.  Taking each session as a
data point creates a small sample and is the most conservative test.  We will generally
compromise and report the group-level analysis, noting the least conservative individual analysis
and the most conservative session analysis in footnotes. In both auction sessions, there is a clear
difference between earnings of unmixed groups and mixed groups before bids are added in, as
expected, which is highly significant at all levels of analysis.17
The crucial comparison is between mixed-group earnings with bids added in (i.e., the
amount the mixed-group subjects actually earned), and unmixed-group earnings.  The results
differ across the two auction treatments.  In the Vickrey treatment the mixed-plus-bid earnings
average $1.17, and unmixed groups average $4.32.  The difference is significantly negative for
groups (t10 = 2.344, p = 0.021).
18  In the first-price treatment the mixed-plus-bid earnings average
                                                 
17 The results with individuals as the unit of analysis are t106 = 13.208, p < .001 in first-price
treatment, and t46 = 9.166, p < .001 in Vickrey. The results with groups as the unit of analysis are
t25 = 8.100, p < .001 in first-price and t10 = 4.680, p < .001 in Vickrey sessions. The results with
session-level analysis are t8 = 5.780, p < .001 in first-price treatment and t3 = 3.304, p = 0.023 in
Vickrey treatment.
18 In the Vickrey sessions, a subject in the mixed group would earn an additional amount greater
than or equal to her bid, but her bid reflects her valuation of the merger, so the sum of
performance-based earnings and bids is the proper measure to use here. The individual analysis
result is t46 = 4.623, p < .001; the session analysis result is t3 = 1.632, p = 0.101 for the one-tailed,
one-sample test.
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$4.45, and unmixed groups average $4.21.  This small difference is not significant in the group-
level analysis (t25 = 0.528, p = 0.301) or at any other level.19
However, keep in mind that bids in the first-price treatment are, in theory, strategically
inflated.  Therefore, even if bidders underestimate the difficulty of merging, they could still show
a result in which net earnings for mixed groups (with bids added in) and unmixed groups are
close together.  We use an econometric procedure to estimate underlying valuations from first-
price bids (see Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) and Appendix 2).  This procedure basically
runs a bidding function (which maps values into bids) in reverse: By assuming independent
private values and equilibrium bidding, unobserved values can be guessed from bids.  Through
estimates of the distribution of bids across all sessions, this technique allows us to generate an
estimated value for each bidder.  This value should be interpreted as the bidder’s guess about the
expected cost of joining the mixed group.  While the estimated value distribution on the whole
looked reasonable, the lowest bidders had some fairly large negative inferred values, which are
probably an unreasonable artifact of the specification underlying the procedure and hence were
excluded.20
The only other experimental application of the procedure (Bajari and Hortacsu, 2005)
used data in which valuations were known because they were controlled by the experimenter.
Their application pretends the values are not known, infers them econometrically, and compares
the inferred values to the actual ones under various models of bidding.  For values uniformly
                                                 
19 The individual analysis gives t106 = 0.806, p = 0.211 and the session analysis gives t8 = 0.360, p
= 0.364 for the one-sample, one-tailed test.
20 A negative inferred value implies that a bidder would pay a substantial sum to be in the mixed
group. This is very likely an artifact of the specification of underlying values in the procedure,
because no one in the Vickrey sessions bid a negative amount. We excluded negative values
when finding the cumulative distribution of inferred values.
27
distributed in the interval [0, $30], the average estimation error is only $1.39 for a Nash bidding
model including risk-aversion, so the procedure shows some promise in the simplest cases.
The value-inference procedure can be used to answer two questions.
First, are inferred underlying values from first-price bids closer to the Vickrey bids than
the first-price bids are?  If the subjects randomly sampled into the first-price and Vickrey
sessions have the same distribution of underlying values (up to sampling error), and the Vickrey
subjects are bidding around their values (as they should in theory), then the inferred-value and
Vickrey bid distributions should be closer together than the Vickrey and first-price bids are.
Figure 6a shows the three cdf’s of Vickrey bids, first-price bids, and inferred values, pooling
across subjects, for phase I.  (The actual cost distribution—that is, the gap between mixed and
unmixed earnings—is also plotted as a benchmark.)  The value cdf inferred from first-price bids
is indeed closer to the Vickrey distribution than the original first-price bids are, though the
inferred values are still somewhat higher than the Vickrey bids (K-S test, p=0.016).  This gives
some assurance that the value inference procedure is on the right track.
Second, do the Vickrey bids, and first-price inferred values, of subjects who entered the
mixed group (those with the lowest bids) approximate the actual costs of merging?  Figure 6b
shows a distribution of the lowest two values for six draws from the inferred-value distribution
and Vickrey distribution.  We are interested in these artificial distributions because even if the
mean inferred valuation is approximately correct (as it appears to be from Figure 6a), if the two
lowest bidders’ valuations are too optimistic, then they will join mixed groups and be surprised
at their poor relative performance. Figure 6b shows that there does appear to be such a winner’s
curse: The low-value distributions (inferred from first-price bids, and using raw Vickrey bids)
are well below the actual cost distribution.
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Figure 6a.  Bid and inferred value distributions, first merger stage.
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Figure 6b.  Distributions of lowest inferred values and Vickrey bids, first merger stage.
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Thus, in the first merger stage, it appears that guesses about mixed-group earnings are
generally too optimistic.  Furthermore, the average Vickrey bid and the average value inferred
from first-price bids are pretty good forecasts of actual costs (the mixed-group minus unmixed
earnings difference) but the values of those who joined the mixed group (the low bidders) are too
optimistic.  It appears that in these simple experiments, subjects have some tendency to be
surprised at how difficult assimilation is.
d.  Second Merger Stage
In the second merger stage, guesses and bids are more accurate but are also consistent
with anchoring on the results of the first merger stage.  Earnings in the second merger phase rise
steadily across the 10 periods.  By analogy to actual corporate mergers, there appears to be a
learning curve in “learning to merge” and create common code rapidly and accurately.  The
mixed groups suffered an initial dip in earnings compared to the last round of the previous
picture-naming task, but within about four periods the mixed groups surpassed the mixed-group
performance in the preceding phase and continued to earn more.  However, guesses and bids
both suggest that subjects did not anticipate this improvement—they are too pessimistic about
mixed group performance.
Two thirds of the guesses about mixed-group earnings (67.3%) were below the average
earnings of the mixed group.  The mean difference between average earnings and guesses was
$.60, with a 95% confidence interval of [$.36, $.83] based on the bootstrap resampling.  The fact
that 76% of the guesses were within $1 of the mixed-group previous average earnings (which
subjects were told) suggests subjects are anchoring on the mixed-group experience in the first
stage to forecast the mixed group’s experience in the second stage.
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Bids in this stage also indicate anchoring.  Bids in the first-price auction treatment were
statistically similar in both merger stages.21  The average of the winning bids across the two
stages is $3.40.  When bids are added in, the mixed groups in the second merger stage received
higher earnings than the unmixed groups did (t25 = 4.16, p < .001 for the group analysis).
22  On
average, mixed group members earned $1.17 more than members of the unmixed group.
In the Vickrey auction treatment, subjects greatly increased their bids after the first
merger stage.23  Winning bids rose from an average of $1.69 in the first merger phase to $3.79 in
the second phase.  When they are included as part of mixed group members’ earnings, these
increased bids, as well as an improvement in performance, cause the mixed group members to
make significantly more than members of the unmixed groups in the second phase, at the group
level (t10 = 4.589, p < .001).
24  Mixed group members earned an average of $.36 more than the
unmixed group members.
The inferred values from the first-price session nearly match the Vickrey values in this
second merger stage (K-S test, p=0.165; see Figure 6c), so it is not surprising that they are
significantly higher than the distribution of actual costs (K-S test, p=0.000).  Figure 6c highlights
the disparity between actual costs in the second merger and the inferred valuations and Vickrey
bids.  The general overreaction to the previous stage also helped the lowest bidders avoid the
                                                 
21 The p-value for the combined Kolmogorov-Smirnov test comparing all bids in merger stage
one to all bids in merger stage 2 is 0.905.  Comparing only winning bids, p = 1.000.
22 The session result with bids added in is t8 = 2.98, p = 0.009 and with individuals is t106 = 4.360,
p < .001.
23 The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for the hypothesis that stage one bids were lower than stage two
bids gives a p-value of 0.030 when all bids are considered, and a p-value of 0.006 when only
winning bids are considered.
24 The session level analysis gives t3= 1.410, p = 0.127.
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Figure 6c.  Bid and inferred value distributions, second merger stage.
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Figure 6d.  Distributions of lowest inferred values and Vickrey bids, second merger stage.
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winner’s curse: As Figure 6d shows, the bootstrapped distributions of low values for both the
Vickrey and first-price treatments are very close to the distribution of actual costs.25
It is possible that subjects had trouble estimating the performance of the mixed group
because they did not know how many of the same people would be returning to the mixed group
for the second merger phase.  A mixed group that retained its original members could use the
code developed in the first merger stage, whereas a group with a lot of new members would need
to create new code.  In fact, only one mixed group remained intact in both phases.  On average,
about 1.8 of the 4 players in the original mixed group were replaced in the second merger stage.
Learning effects were strong despite large turnover in the group membership from the first to the
second merger phase.
Taken together, the two merger stages illustrate a common underestimation of the effect
of structural changes. In the first stage, the lowest bidders systematically underestimate how
much earnings will suffer when groups are mixed. But in the second stage, the overestimate the
earnings decline—or put differently, they underestimate the improvement from the first stage to
the second.
6.  Conclusion
This study used simple artificial firms to study the development of organizational code,
and what happens when firms with different codes merge.  The firms’ task is to name target
pictures from a set, by developing natural language descriptions of the pictures—the
“code”—which enable an observer to know which of many pictures was a target.  Code use of
                                                 
25 Although K-S tests indicate that the distributions of low values are significantly different from
actual costs (p=0.000 for both treatments), these tests are affected by the large vertical gaps
caused by the bootstrapping procedure and the deviations are small in magnitude.
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this sort is like an organization where one person sees a situation or object clearly and must
convey it to another person (like police dispatching, journalism or a busy restaurant kitchen).
Good code is short and distinctive, because firms are penalized for going slowly and for
choosing the wrong pictures.  The goal was to learn about development of code, and whether
employees could accurately judge how difficult mergers would be because of “cultural conflict”
due to differences in code and familiarity.  The experiments do not attempt to recreate all the
complexities of naturally-occurring organizations.  We simply tried to take one element of firms
which can be created and measured, and has economic value, and study some of its properties.
The experimental sessions began with students in separate six-person groups on the
UCLA and Caltech campuses, creating code for pictures of their own campuses.  After a
common training phase, the mergers were created by asking subjects how much they would
demand to be paid to join a mixed four-person group, with two people from their own-campus
group, and two others from the opposite campus.  This gives us a measure of how well the
subjects think the mergers will go, and also sorts them into mixed (i.e., merger) and unmixed
groups endogenously.
Not surprisingly, the mixed groups were slower than the unmixed groups and made more
mistakes.  Guesses about the performance of the mixed groups, and bids in an incentive-
compatible Vickrey auction, underestimated the difficulty of the merger.  First-price bids priced
the merger difficulty accurately, but are also likely to be biased upward by rational strategic
inflation.  To correct for this we used an econometric procedure to infer unobserved valuations
from bids.  The procedure basically takes a bidding function, which maps a value onto a bid, and
runs the process in reverse, inferring what unobserved value must have led to an observed bid.
The one study that applied this procedure to experimental data (where inferred values and actual
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values can be compared) found a rather accurate correspondence, after adjustment for risk-
aversion.  This procedure shows that the values inferred from all first-price bids are rather
accurate guesses of mixed group earnings differentials, as are Vickrey bids on the whole.
However, the lowest bidders—those who actually join the mixed groups—are systematically too
optimistic.  We consider this an “organizational winner’s curse,” in which the most optimistic
organization members will be most willing to make structural changes, and are too optimistic
even when the average person is accurate.
Estimates of the mixed group’s earnings switched from being overly optimistic in the
first merger stage to being a little too pessimistic in the second merger stage.  Estimates seemed
to reflect a belief that the mixed group’s performance had flattened out and would not improve in
the second merger stage, although it did.
Inaccurate guesses in both stages are also consistent with anchoring effects. Participants
seemed to extrapolate from the experience in the previous phase to the next phase, even though
they were clearly instructed about the structural adjustment between phases.  The reversal in the
first and second stages also means people are not being irrational or optimistic in
general—instead, those who participate in the changes do not have rational expectations about
the impact of the change.  The fact that subjects are much more accurate in the second stage,
however, indicates a process of learning.
Future Research
One line of future research is alternative mechanisms for sorting employees into the
merged firm.  In our design employees had to be paid to join the merger, but an alternative is to
require employees to pay to stay in an unmixed group (corresponding to having to incur
relocation or switching costs to stay in their “old job”).  Another line of research is turnover: A
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merger can be intended to trim duplicated human resources from the two merging firms, but in
practice the best workers often leave rather than the worst ones.  Richer structures in which
managers can pick and choose who stays or goes, and workers can choose whether to stay or go,
could look for these selection effects and their impact.
Future studies could create firms around a different kind of expertise.  The subjects in this
study were “experts” on a topic they would not expect members of the other group to know
anything about.  Those who entered the mixed group therefore knew that members from the
other school would not understand if they named their own campus buildings by names like
“Bunche” or “Millikan.”  The curse of knowledge was unlikely to play a large role in subjects’
descriptions of the pictures or in their valuations for the merger.  However, it could have a much
more pronounced role if the original firms are composed of experts on areas that others might
also know about.  For example, one group might see pictures of famous artwork while the other
sees pictures of famous movie scenes.  When the groups merge, members might assume they can
still use proper names, only to be shocked that some people do not know which image
“Waterlilies” refers to or which film is “Casablanca.”  Creating these truly expert groups would
require more extensive training, or pre-screening of subjects by their expertise, but would
capture a stronger “curse of knowledge” among experts who cannot imagine that others won’t
understand their codes.
  A common problem in mergers is that employees from one firm are marginalized.  Even
when firms merge as “equals,” one often takes the dominant role and attempts to impose its
culture on members of the other firm.  (See Weber and Camerer, 2003, for an example of
dominance in the Daimler-Chrysler “merger of equals.”)  Using the picture-naming paradigm,
we could see if one firm imposes its code on the other when there are a disproportionate number
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of people from each original group, or a longer history, and study the manner in which it does
this.  Members of the dominant firm might create their own code for pictures that the other firm
is familiar with and they may not explain their code to the new members.  They might also try to
train the smaller firm on their code, as we witnessed in some sessions involving a person who
was unfamiliar with the campus.
Weber, Rick, and Camerer (2004) also study managerial structures and response to
change (new situations and new employees).  They find that rotating managers improves
performance but impairs response to change.  One could also study “hypercode” (how short do
codes become with very long training?), and the role of emotions, humor and memory in code
formation and transmission with time interruptions and organizational turnover (cf. Heath and
Seidel, undated). 
Any of these ideas could be examined by slightly altering the flexible paradigm used in
this study.  Although we cannot capture all the intricacies of culture in simple experiments, this
paradigm allowed us to examine one important facet of culture and create precise measures to
test our hypotheses on the cultural difficulties involved in mergers.
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Appendix 1:  Additional graphs.
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Figure A1.  Average completion time by round (all sessions pooled).
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Figure A2.  Average number of incorrect guesses by round (all sessions pooled).
Appendix 2: Value Inference Procedure
This appendix describes how we made use of the structural procedure of Guerre, Perrigne,
and Vuong (GPV, 2000) to estimate the unobserved values of bidders in the first-price auction
treatments. The focus here is on the application of the technique for the type of auction we
used; see GPV for details about the technique itself.
The GPV procedure uses the distribution of bids in an auction to estimate the distribution
of values. Note that since we used a “procurement” auction, “values” are in fact valuations
for remaining in the unmixed group instead of joining the mixed group. In other words,
the values we want to infer are each bidder’s perceived cost of joining the mixed group. We
will assume that each bidder i’s valuation vi is private information that is independent and
identically distributed with cdf F (·) and pdf f(·), which has support [v, v], with upper bound
v = 20.1 If a bidder has either the lowest or the second lowest bid in her group, she is placed
in the mixed group and gets utility bi − vi; otherwise, she gets 0. We denote the symmetric
equilibrium bidding function as b = s(v).
The expected profit of a bidder is her gains from winning, bi − vi, times the probability
of winning. In our setup, the probability of winning is the sum of the probability of having
the lowest bid and the probability of having the second-lowest bid (i.e. bidding higher than
only one other bid). We can also think of this as the probability of having a bid less than
or equal to the second lowest of all other bids. To maximize profit, then, a bidder solves the
following:
max
b
E[(b− v)1(b ≤ B2)|v] = max
x
∫ v
x
[s(x)− v]fy2|v(y2|v) dy2,
where B2 = s(y2) is the second lowest of others’ bids.
Since subjects bid in groups of 6, each bidder would need to bid below or tie the second
lowest of 5 other bids. Therefore, fy2|v(y2|v) = 20F (y2)[1 − F (y2)]3f(y2). The first order
1A more general analysis could assume value affiliation, as in Li, Perrigne, and Vuong (2002). We are
unable to use the procedure for affiliated private values because it requires a much larger amount of data.
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condition at x = v is:
−(s(x)− v) · 20F (x)[1− F (x)]3f(x) +
∫ v
x
s′(x) · 20F (y2)[1− F (y2)]3f(y2) dy2 = 0
Plugging in x = v and simplifying, we get:
1 = (s(v)− v) · 20F (v)[1− F (v)]
3f(v)
−4[1− F (v)]5 + 5[1− F (v)]4 ·
1
s′(v)
(1)
This gives an expression to infer F(v) from s(v). Following GPV, we use the distribution
of bids to obtain estimates of values. We denote the distribution and density of bids by G(·)
and g(·), respectively. For every b ∈ [b, b] = [s(v), v], G(b) = P (b˜ ≤ b) = P (v˜ ≤ s−1(b)) =
F (s−1(b)) = F (v), since b = s(v). G(·) is continuous with support [v, s(v)] and density
g(b) = f(v)/s′(v).
Using b = s(v), F (v) = G(s(v)), and f(v) = g(s(v)) · s′(v), (1) becomes:
v = b−
[−4[1−G(b)]5 + 5[1−G(b)]4
20G(b)[1−G(b)]3g(b)
]
(2)
Using this equation, we can estimate vˆ, the inferred values, by getting estimates for G(b)
and g(b).
To estimate gˆ(b), we considered all bids less than or equal to 20.2 We smoothed the set
of bids using an Epanechnikov kernel. The bandwidth was chosen so that the density would
have a single peak but not be overly smooth.3 The cumulative distribution function, Gˆ(b),
was calculated from the point estimates of gˆ(b).
The estimates Gˆ(b) and gˆ(b) were plugged into equation (2). The points used for the
kernel smoothing served as “b” in this equation. This provided a value estimate for each
point in the kernel smoothing. The actual bids were then rounded up to match these points
2This excluded bids above the 97th percentile in the first merger stage of the first price treatment, and
we excluded bids above 20 in further analysis for the sake of consistency.
3The bandwidth was 1.40 for the first merger stage and 0.99 for the second.
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to find the inferred value corresponding to each bid.
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